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QUANTIFYING INFORMATION LEAK VULNERABILITIES
JONATHAN HEUSSER⋆ AND PASQUALE MALACARIA†
Abstract. Leakage of confidential information represents a serious security risk. Despite
a number of novel, theoretical advances, it has been unclear if and how quantitative ap-
proaches to measuring leakage of confidential information could be applied to substantial,
real-world programs. This is mostly due to the high complexity of computing precise leak-
age quantities. In this paper, we introduce a technique which makes it possible to decide
if a program conforms to a quantitative policy which scales to large state-spaces with the
help of bounded model checking.
Our technique is applied to a number of officially reported information leak vulnerab-
ilities in the Linux Kernel. Additionally, we also analysed authentication routines in the
Secure Remote Password suite and of a Internet Message Support Protocol implement-
ation. Our technique shows when there is unacceptable leakage; the same technique is
also used to verify, for the first time, that the applied software patches indeed plug the
information leaks.
This is the first demonstration of quantitative information flow addressing security
concerns of real-world industrial programs.
1. Introduction
Quantitative Information Flow (QIF) [3, 11] aims to provide techniques and tools able
to quantify leakage of confidential information. As a motivating example consider a proto-
typical password checking program
if (password==guess) access=1; else access=0;
Notice how there is an unavoidable leakage of confidential information in this program: an
attacker observing the value of access will be able to infer if he guessed the right password
(complete leakage if he did guess it right) and if the guess was wrong he will have eliminated
one possibility from the search space. Notice also how essential the amount of information
leaked is: if the amount leaked is very small then the program could as well be considered
secure.
If, as the above example illustrates, leakage is somehow unavoidable then the real question
is not whether or not programs leak, but how much. This point is what makes Quantitative
Information Flow an appealing theory. In a nutshell, QIF aims to measure the amount of
information from confidential data (in the above example the variable password) that an
attacker who can read/write the public input data (guess) will be able to infer from some
observable variable (access).
However, implementing a precise QIF analysis for secret sizes of more than a few bits
is computationally infeasible; roughly speaking this is because classical QIF computes the
entropy of a random variable whose complexity is the same as computing all possible runs of
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the program. Even when abstraction techniques and statistical sampling are integrated with
QIF [9] to help the scalability issues a useful analysis for real code still seems problematic.
In this paper, we introduce a useful quantitative analysis for C code: we will demonstrate
the analysis on reported information leakage vulnerabilities in the Linux Kernel and the
PHP interpreter. All of the covered vulnerabilities are referenced by the standardised
vulnerability repository CVE from Mitre1.
To address the computational feasibility of the quantitative analysis we shift the focus
from the question “How much does it leak?” to the simpler quantitative question “Does it
leak more than k?”. We will show how the questions are related and more importantly we
will show that off-the-shelf symbolic model checkers like CBMC [5] are able to efficiently
answer the second kind of question. CBMC is a good choice for several reasons: (i) it makes
it easy to parse and analyse large ANSI-C based projects (ii) it models bit-vector semantics
of C accurately which makes it able to detect arithmetic overflows amongst others, which
turns out to be important (iii) nondeterministic choice functions can be used to easily model
user input, which also enjoys efficient solving due to the symbolic nature of the model checker
(iv) despite being a bounded model checker, CBMC can check whether enough unwinding
of the transition system were performed to prove that there are no deeper counterexamples.
Our experiments show that the analysis not only quantifies the leakage but also helps in
understanding the nature of the leak. In particular, the counterexample produced by the
model checker, when a leakage property is violated, can provide insights into the cause of
the leak. For example, we can extract a public user input from the counterexample needed
to trigger a violation.
Another surprising result of our experiment is that in certain circumstances we were able
to use our technique to prove whether the official patch provided for the vulnerability does
actually eliminate the information leak. This is achieved by point (iv) from above, when
the model checking process is actually complete.
In summary the main technical contributions of this paper are the following:
(1) We present the first quantitative leakage analysis of systems software.
(2) We show how to express Quantitative Information Flow properties that can be
efficiently checked using bounded symbolic model checking.
(3) We show that the technique not only quantifies leakage in real code but also provides
valuable information about the nature of the leak.
(4) In some cases we are able to prove that official patches for reported vulnerability
do indeed eliminate leakage; these constitute the first positive proofs of absence of
QIF vulnerabilities for real-world systems programs.
2. Model of Programs and Distinctions
We aim to model the input/output behaviour of a C function where inputs are formal
arguments to the function and outputs are either return values or pointer arguments.
In the following we will consider P to be a C function taking high and low inputs noted
h, l; we call observables low variables whose values are “publicly available” after running P .
As an example consider the following “modulo” program
1http://cve.mitre.org, CVE is industry-endorsed with over 70 companies actively involved.
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o = (h % 4 ) + l
and suppose h is a 4 bits variable with values 0..15 and l a 1 bit variable with values 0,1;
then the low input for P is the variable l and the observable is the variable o whose possible
values are 0..5.
Formally, a program P is modelled as transition system TS = (S, T, I, F ) with S being
the program states, T ⊆ S × S are the program transitions and I the initial states and F
the final states. Let us define a successor function for a state s ∈ S
Post(s) = {s′ ∈ S | (s, s′) ∈ T}
A state s is in F if Post(s) = ∅. A path is a finite sequence of states π = s0s1s2 . . . sn such
that s0 ∈ I and sn ∈ F .
A state is a tuple S = SH × SL of the pair of confidential input H and low input L. We
consider initial/final or input/output pairs of states of a path, 〈(h, l), o〉 where the second
component is the output o produced by the final state drawn from some output alphabet O.
In the above example an input/output pair would be 〈(5, 1), 2〉 representing the computation
(5%4) + 1 = 2.
Confidential inputs are denoted as h ∈ H, low inputs l ∈ L, and low observations o ∈ O,
where the output behaviour of the function is always a low observation and the input is an
initial state (h, l). A distinction on the confidential input through observations O is one
where there exists at least two paths through P , modelled as TS, which leads to different
observations for different confidential input but constant low input.
We define an equivalence relation ≃P,l on the values of the high variables as follows:
h ≃P,l h
′ iff if 〈(h, l), o〉, 〈(h′, l), o′〉 are input/output pairs in P then o = o′.
Hence, two high values are equivalent (w.r.t. a low value l) if they cannot be distinguished
by any observable. In the running example an equivalence class in ≃P,1 would for example
be {1, 5, 9, 13}. The equivalence relation associated to P, l is an element of the set of all
possible equivalence relation on the values of high.
Let I(SH) as the set of all possible equivalence relations on a set SH . Define on I(SH)
the order:
(1) ≈ ⊑ ∼ ↔ ∀s1, s2 (s1 ∼ s2 ⇒ s1 ≈ s2)
where≈,∼ ∈ I(SH) and s1, s2 ∈ SH . ⊑ defines a complete lattice over SH . It is a refinement
order with bottom element being the relation relating every state and top element being
the identity relation. This is described as the Lattice of Information [10].
Non leaking programs (i.e. satisfying non-interference [7]) are characterised as follows:
Proposition 1. P is non-interfering iff for all l, ≃P,l is the least element in I(SH) .
An attacker controlling the low inputs can be modelled by an equivalence relation ≃P
corresponding to a particular ≃P,l.
Formally, we define a quantitative policy as a non-negative natural number N . A relation
≃P,l breaches a policy if | ≃P,l | > N (where | ≃P,l | is the number of equivalence classes of
≃P,l). In our model, an attacker will always choose a relation breaching the policy, provided
that given a policy and a program such a relation exists. We use ≃P with the program P
being initialised with the attacker’s choice of l2.
2In the paper such attacker choices will be modelled by the nondeterministic choice function input().
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In the above example, a choice could be ≃P = ≃P,0 corresponding to the program l=0;
o = (h % 4 ) + l.
Quantitative Information Flow uses information theoretical measures like Shannon en-
tropy to measure leakage of confidential information. The measure of a program can be
broken down into two main steps [11, 8]:
(1) interpret the program as a random variable RP
(2) compute the entropy of RP (noted H(RP ))
It has been shown that RP and ≃P coincide [11, 13]. For example for the modulo program
above under the assumption of uniform distribution on the input there are 4 equivalence
classes each having probability 1
4
. The Shannon entropy of that program is then
4 ∗ −
1
4
log2(
1
4
) = 2
This number 2 represents the fact that the observations reveal which of the 4 possible classes
(i.e. 2 bits of information) the high input belongs to.
RP and ≃P are also order related as the following proposition shows [8]:
Proposition 2. ≃P ⊑ ≃P ′ iff for all probability distributions H(RP ) ≤ H(RP ′)
To further understand the importance of ≃P in Quantitative Information Flow we need
to introduce the information theoretical concept of channel capacity: consider the password
check example from the introduction. Suppose the password is a 64 bits randomly chosen
string; we have two equivalence classes, one with 1 element so having probability 1
264
, the
other class with 264 − 1 elements having thus probability 1 − 1
264
. The entropy is then
3.46944695× 10−18 : as expected a password check of a big password should leak very little.
Suppose however that the probabilities of the high inputs are such that both equivalence
classes have probability 1
2
. Then the entropy dramatically raises to 1 which is the channel
capacity, i.e. the maximum leakage achievable given two classes: log2(2) = log2(| ≃P |). In
the modulo example the channel capacity is 2 which happens to be given by the uniform
distribution on the high input. Other distributions on the high input cannot give higher
entropy: for example if we consider the distribution where all even numbers have equal
probability 1
8
, and all odd numbers have 0 probability then the resulting entropy will be 1.
The following result establishes basic relationships between leakage, channel capacity,
and number of distinctions:
Proposition 3.
(1) P is non-interfering iff log2(| ≃P |) = 0
(2) The channel capacity3 of P is log2(| ≃P |) .
(3) If for all probability distributions H(RP ) ≤ H(RP ′) then | ≃P | ≤ | ≃P ′ |
Point (1) is proved in [4], (2) in [12] and (3) is a consequence of proposition 2 whose proof
is in [8]. Hence a lower bound on | ≃P | provides a lower bound on the channel capacity of
the program P .
3The channel capacity is the maximum possible leakage where we consider all possible probability distri-
butions on the inputs [12]
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Hence, because of proposition 3 the inequality | ≃P | > N , which is at the heart of our
analysis, can be rephrased to the following statement: in a setting where the distribution of
the secret is the most favourable for the attacker then the leakage is at least log2(N) bits.
3. Encoding Distinction-Based Quant Policies
Recall that for a program P a quantitative policy is a natural number N which limits
the cardinality of ≃P to N .
In other words, a program violates a quantitative policy if it makes more distinctions
than what is allowed in the policy. A leaking programs is one breaching the policy N = 1
in the above definition.
We take ideas from assume-guarantee reasoning [17] to encode such a policy in a driver
function, which tries to trigger a violation, i.e. producing a counterexample, of the policy.
If the policy states that the function func is not allowed to make more than 2 distinctions
then this is modelled as shown in Program 1. This driver only has a high component as a
state, which is passed to the function func where the policy is tested on.
int h1,h2,h3;
int o1,o2,o3;
h1 = input(); h2 = input(); h3 = input();
o1 = func(h1);
o2 = func(h2);
assume(o1 != o2); // (A)
o3 = func(h3);
assert(o3 == o1 || o3 == o2); // (B)
Program 1: Example driver checking for 2 distinctions
Drivers always have a similar structure: we model the secret by a nondeterministic choice
function input() as a placeholder for all possible values of that type; then for a policy of
checking for N distinctions, the function under inspection is called N times. The crucial
step (A) is the use of the assume statement after the calls: the driver assumes that, in this
case, there are two different return values found already. The function is called an N +1th
time and at (B) the driver asserts that the next output is either one of the previously found
outputs.
The assume statement only considers execution paths which satisfy the given boolean
formula, all other paths are rejected. Further, the bounded model checker used will try to
find a counterexample to the negated assertion claim, which is only satisfiable if and only
if a counterexample exists. If it is unsatisfiable means that the original claim holds, i.e.
the program conforms to the policy. The verification condition generated by the bounded
model checker for the policy in Program 1 is:
o1 != o2 =⇒ (o3 == o1 || o3 == o2)
Where the bounded model checker tries to find a counterexample (execution path) using
the negated claim such that the following holds
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Input: Function func, types t,t’,t’’, comparison eq t, bound k, threshold N
Output: Driver.c
t o_1, . . ., o_n, o_n+1;
t’ h_1, . . ., h_n, h_n+1;
t’’ l;
h_1 = input(); . . . h_n = input();
l = input();
o_1 = func(h_1, l);
...
o_n = func(h_n, l);
assume(!eq_t(o_1, o_2) && !eq_t(o_1, o_3) && . . .);
o_n+1 = func(h_n+1, l);
assert(eq_t(o_n+1, o_1) || eq_t(o_n+1, o_2) || . . .);
Algorithm 1: Template to syntactically generate a driver for an N distinction policy
o1 != o2 ∧ o3 != o1 ∧ o3 != o2
i.e. that there are three distinctions possible.
Another possibility is that the function func does not even make two distinctions, such
that the assume statement at point (A) is always false, which leads to proving the policy
(or any policy) vacuously true, because for any assertion Q the verification condition is true,
i.e. false =⇒ Q.
3.1. Bounded Model Checking. We use the bounded model checker CBMC to verify
or falsify a policy. CBMC encodes an ANSI-C program into a propositional formula by
unwinding the transition relation and user defined specifications up to some bound. This
formula is only satisfiable if there exists an error trace violating the specification.
The tool can also check if the unwinding bound is sufficient by introducing unwinding
assertions, which are assertions on the negated loop guards. This ensures that no longer
counterexample can exist than the used bound. To prove any properties the analysis has to
pass unwinding assertions, otherwise it can only be used as a way to find counterexamples
up to the unwinding bound.
The C program gets encoded into constraints C and the property – user defined assertions
– are encoded in P . Then the model checker tries to find a satisfiable assignment to the
formula
C ∧ ¬P
where P is an accumulation of the assumptions and assertions made in the program text.
Thus if there are two assume statements in the driver with expressions E1 and E2 and one
assert statement with expression Q then P is
P ≡ E1 ∧ E2 =⇒ Q
3.2. Driver. A general template for a driver is described in Algorithm 1. The inputs to
the algorithm are the function func to be analysed, possibly up to three different types for
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the input/output pair 〈(h, l), o〉, and a comparison function eq t which returns true if the
arguments of type t are equal, where t is the type of the observation of function func. This
comparison function could be as simple as == of C, or a more complex function, such as
memcmp, if t is an array or string. Also note, that the observations o i do not need to be
only return values, but can also be pointer arguments to func.
Proposition 4 (Correctness of driver template). If the driver template in Algorithm 1 is
successfully verified up to a bound k (i.e. the negated claim is unsatisfiable) then the function
func does not make more than N distinctions on the output within the bound k. Formally,
we state that the validity of the driver implies the validity of the following implication
o1 6= o2 ∧ o1 6= o3 ∧ · · · ∧ on−1 6= on =⇒ on+1 = o1 ∨ · · · ∨ on+1 = on
Thus, we can make the following claims on the result of the model checking process: For
a given bound k and a policy,
• if the model checker finds a counterexample then the policy is violated, i.e. the
program makes more distinctions than specified
• if the process ends with a successful verification of the policy without unwinding
assertions then the policy holds up to an unwinding of k.
• if the process ends with a successful verification of the policy with unwinding asser-
tions then the policy holds for any number of iterations.
4. Checking Quantitative Policies
The steps in checking a program or function for the compliance with a quantitative policy
are as follows: (1) Define the input state (h, l) and output state o in the code, i.e. the
confidential input h, the low input l and the observation o (2) Define the maximum number
of distinctions in the policy and an unwinding factor k (3) Generate a driver function using
the template in Algorithm 1 (4) Run CBMC on the driver. If the driver is successfully
verified, potentially increase the unwinding factor.
4.1. Modelling Low Input. A crucial aspect of our analysis is to model low user input,
which is most of the time responsible for triggering a bug which causes the information
leak. These bugs only happen on a very restricted number of execution paths and could be
exploited by a malicious user choosing a special user input. This scenario generally applies
when studying many CVE reported information leakage vulnerabilities.
Let us look at the following simplified code in Program 2, which contains an integer
underflow, taken from the vulnerability CVE-2007-2875 in the linux kernel.
At first, it seems not possible that the point (C) where the secret h gets returned is
ever executed, because exactly that check is done in (A) which reduces the variable nbytes
to be within the bound bufsz. However, due to wrong choice and combination of types,
the subtraction in (B) causes an underflow in nbytes for a very large ppos value. And
unfortunately, ppos is a user controlled input variable, such that when its value is chosen
correctly, point (C) is reached.
In this case, a state in the system is the tuple (h, l) which represents the arguments to
the function underflow, i.e. the formal parameters h and ppos; observations are the return
values of this function. The generated driver can automatically find the low part of a state
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typedef long long loff_t;
typedef unsigned int size_t;
int underflow(int h, loff_t ppos) {
int bufsz;
size_t nbytes;
bufsz=1024;
nbytes=20;
if (ppos + nbytes > bufsz) // (A)
nbytes = bufsz - ppos; // (B)
if(ppos + nbytes > bufsz) {
return h; // (C)
} else {
return 0;
}
}
Program 2: Integer underflow causing a leak
which triggers such subsequent information leaks, because the analysis instructs the model
checker to find any possible execution path satisfying the assumptions and assertions on
the outputs, given nondeterministic high values and fixed low inputs. As SAT-based model
checking is precise down to the individual bit, it will find a low input which triggers the
underflow and uncovers the leak.
CBMC generates a counterexample falsifying a policy of e.g. no leakage and thereby
having triggered the integer underflow. The following excerpt of the counterexample
State 14 file underflow.c line 40 function main thread 0
----------------------------------------------------
underflow::main::1::l=1706688912 (00000000...
....
State 35 file underflow.c line 13 function underflow thread 0
----------------------------------------------------
underflow::underflow::1::nbytes=4027596816 (11110000...
shows that a low input of l=1706688912 lead to an nbytes which underflowed from the
previous value 20.
Clearly, for such leaks to be detected it needs bit-level precise reasoning, just like SAT-
based bounded model checkers support.
4.2. Environment. In model checking, the environment, like library function calls or gen-
erally functions and data structures which have no implementation, need to be modelled
in a way which allows for the property to be verified. Out of the box, CBMC replaces
function calls with no implementation with nondeterministic values.
As our analysis needs to check for equality on inputs and outputs of functions a certain
number of common library function have to be modelled in a way which preserves their
original semantics. For example, the usual library C functions memcmp, and strcmp are
implemented in a way which return 0 if their arguments are equal and a value not equal to
0 if they are not equal. The functions memset and memcpy actually set an array of integers
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Description CVE Bulletin LOC k⋆ Patch Proof log2(N) Time
AppleTalk CVE-2009-3002 237 64 X 6 bit 1h39m
tcf fill node CVE-2009-3612 146 64 X 6 bit 3m34s
sigaltstack CVE-2009-2847 199 128 X 7 bit 49m50s
cpuset† CVE-2007-2875 63 64 × 6 bit 1m32s
SRP getpass – 93 8 X 1 bit 0.128s
login unix – 128 8 – 2 bit 8.364s
Table 1. Experimental Results. ⋆ Number of unwindings † From Section 4.1
or characters to a certain value or to the content of another array. The same applies to
linux kernel utility functions such as copy to user and copy from user which copy memory
blocks to or from userspace.
For example, a memcmp implementation is shown in Program 3.
int memcmp(char *s1, char *s2, unsigned int n) {
int i;
for(i=0;i<n;i++) {
if(s1[i] != s2[i]) return -1;
}
return 0;
}
Program 3: Simplified memcmp model
5. Experimental Results
We applied our technique to CVE reported information leakage vulnerabilities in the
Linux Kernel. In the experiments we checked for policy violations and proved whether
official patches resolve the information leakage. We also analysed authentication routines of
the Secure Remote Password protocol (SRP) and of a Internet Message Support Protocol
implementation. A summary of the results is shown in Table 1.
5.1. Linux Kernel. We define information leakage in the kernel always as parts of the
kernel memory which gets mistakenly copied to user space, i.e. the virtual memory allocated
to conventional applications. Clearly, this should not happen as anything allocated in the
kernel space is not meant to be seen by users (except within the bounds of normal user/kernel
interactions), especially in multi-user systems like Linux. Thus, in all examples the kernel
memory is modelled as nondeterministic values.
The interface between user and kernel space are system calls or syscalls in short. Syscalls,
like normal functions, have a number of arguments and a return value where the kernel can
transfer data structures or single values back and forth. This is the crucial point in the
system where information leakage is most common.
AppleTalk. The specific vulnerability CVE-2009-3002 in the appletalk network code
shows a quite common cause of information leakage: a user requests, by a syscall, that a
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structure gets filled with values and returned to user land. The developer however forgot to
assign values to all fields in the struct, thus these missing fields get “filled” with unspecified
kernel memory, as it is allocated on the stack. This CVE security bulletin actually comprises
six different vulnerable network protocol implementations, all following the same leakage
pattern. We will only present the affected code of the AppleTalk implementation – the
same kind of analysis applies to all six vulnerabilities.
In this case the structure returned to the user is shown in Program 4. The leaking
struct sockaddr_at {
u_char sat_len, sat_family, sat_port;
struct at_addr sat_addr;
union {
struct netrange r_netrange;
char r_zero[ 8 ];
} sat_range;
};
#define sat_zero sat_range.r_zero
Program 4: Complex observation struct leads to leak from sat zero.
function is atalk getname in net/appletalk/ddp.c is shown in Program 5.
static int atalk_getname(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *uaddr,
int *uaddr_len, int peer) {
struct sockaddr_at sat;
// Official Patch. Uncommented to trigger leak
//memset(&sat.sat_zero, 0, sizeof(sat.sat_zero));
... // sat structure gets filled
memcpy(uaddr, &sat, sizeof(sat));
return 0;
}
Program 5: Function introducing the leak for CVE-2009-3002.
In the function, the structure sat gets filled with values provided by the kernel, at the
end the whole structure is copied via memcpy to the address of the uaddr pointer, which
is indirectly, via the syscall getsockname copied back to user land. However, the field
sat.sat zero has not been initialised, thus a number of bytes of kernel memory get copied
back to the user.
The secret is implicitly modelled by allocating the sat structure with nondeterministic
values; observations are also of type sockaddr at. The driver uses as parameter eq t the
library function memcmp to compare memories.
The model checker found a counterexample for a 6 bit policy within 1 hour and 39
minutes. Once the official patch was applied of setting the sat structure to 0 with memset,
our driver successfully verified the policy in about the same time with unwinding assertions,
thus it proved that the patch stops the leak.
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tcf fill node. This information leak happens in the netlink subsystem of the kernel.
The function tcf fill node prepares a struct tcmsg to be sent back to the user. However,
the programmer made a typing mistake and filled a field tcm pad1 twice instead of the
second time for tcm pad2.
struct tcmsg *tcm;
...
nlh = NLMSG_NEW(skb, pid, seq, event, sizeof(*tcm), flags);
tcm = NLMSG_DATA(nlh);
tcm->tcm_family = AF_UNSPEC;
tcm->tcm__pad1 = 0;
tcm->tcm__pad1 = 0; // typo, should be tcm__pad2 instead.
Program 6: Function excerpt introducing the leak for CVE-2009-3612.
This leaks kernel memory from tcm pad2 back to userspace. Here, we again modelled
kernel memory implicitly by the memory allocated for tcm through the function NLMSG DATA,
which initialised the fields of the struct with nondeterministic values. The observation is
the filled out variable tcm, the low user input is a simple integer variable not mentioned
here for brevity.
The official patch which was applied to fix the leak is simply changing the last line above
to tcm->tcm pad2=0. We were again able to prove that this patch successfully fixes the
security hole and otherwise the program violates a leakage policy of 6 bits.
Without the patch, a counterexample is found within 3 minutes and 34 seconds; with the
patch, the program is verified within about the same time.
sigaltstack. The leakage for this vulnerability is intricate and only manifests itself on
64-bit processors. On such a system, the struct stack t, as shown in Program 7, will be
padded to a multiple of 8 bytes because on 64-bit systems void* and size t are both 8
bytes (instead of 4 bytes for 32-bit systems), while an integer type remains 4 bytes. Thus,
the size of stack t is padded to 24 bytes, while on a 32-bit system it remains unpadded at
12 bytes.
typedef struct sigaltstack {
void __user *ss_sp;
int ss_flags; // 4 bytes padding on 64-bit systems
size_t ss_size;
} stack_t;
Program 7: Structure with padding depending on architecture.
The syscall do sigaltstack in kernel/signal.c copies such a structure back to userland
via the copy function copy to user, however it does not clear the padding bytes, thus those
are leaked to the user on a 64-bit system. In the function visible in Program 8, the high
input is the structure oss and the low output is the argument uoss.
CBMC supports modelling of 64-bit widths however that is not enough to automatically
measure the padding bytes. This is because the sizeof operator in CBMC returns only
the sum of all sizes without eventual bit alignments. This is solved in our approach by
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int do_sigaltstack (const stack_t __user *uss, stack_t __user *uoss,
unsigned long sp) {
stack_t oss;
... // oss fields get filled
if (copy_to_user(uoss, &oss, sizeof(oss)))
goto out; ....
Program 8: Leakage through copying whole structures including padding.
providing a model of the copy to user function, just like e.g. an implementation of memcpy
is provided, which checks if the length parameter is aligned according to the architecture (4
bytes for 32 and 8 bytes for 64). If there are padding alignments then these will be chosen
to be filled with nondeterministic integer values modulo the number of padding bytes.
In Program 8, this would translate to the following: sizeof(oss) counts 20 bytes as
the size of the structure. However, this does not account for the padding bytes, and our
copy to user model does the following calculation:
pad = ALIGN - (sizeof(oss) % ALIGN);
if(pad == ALIGN) padding = 0;
else padding = ((unsigned int) nondet_int()) % (1 << (pad*8))
where ALIGN is chosen to be 4 or 8 depending on the architecture used. In a 64-bit system,
this translates to 8 − (20%8) = 4 bytes for pad which are represented by the padding
variable.
With this setup, we were able to verify that on a 32-bit system the Program 8 does not
leak anything, while on a 64-bit system this violates a policy of e.g. 7 bits. A counterexample
was found within 49 minutes and 50 seconds. We were also able to prove that the patch
applied removes the padding leak. The patch in this case was to not copy the whole struct
but copying the three struct members separately through the function put user, where
the padding does not come into play.
cpuset. The crucial part of this vulnerability has already been discussed in Section
4.1. Our analysis finds the right low input which triggers the integer underflow. The actual
code however does not simply return the secret as shown in the section mentioned above,
but it copies nbytes number of bytes from a buffer ctr->buf at offset *ppos. Because
if (*ppos + nbytes > ctr->bufsz)
nbytes = ctr->bufsz - *ppos;
if (copy_to_user(buf, ctr->buf + *ppos, nbytes))
return -EFAULT;
of the underflow, nbytes and *ppos access memory way out of the actual buffer and thus
disclose kernel memory. However our analysis of this vulnerability requires at the moment
too much manual intervention to model memory access outside of the allowed bound ( i.e.
ctr->buf + *ppos).
One elegant way of addressing this problem would be by modifying CBMC itself; CBMC
could for example return nondeterministic values for such out-of-bound memory accesses
which would implicitly model the access to confidential data.
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5.2. Authentication Checks. We analysed parts of the authentication routines of the
secure remote password suite (SRP) and the Unix passwd-authentication of Cyrus’ Internet
Message Support Protocol daemon (IMSPD).
SRP. To demonstrate that confidential variables and observations can be used flexibly,
we checked that there is no leakage in the password request function in libsrp/t getpass.c.
The confidential input is the password entered by the user when being prompted at the
login; the observations are the echos of the terminal of typed characters. Whether the
terminal echos the typed characters or not depends on which mode the console is in. The
environment modelling the console and its modes had to be provided to check this program.
_TYPE( int ) t_getpass (char* buf, unsigned maxlen,
const char* prompt) {
DWORD mode;
GetConsoleMode( handle, &mode );
SetConsoleMode( handle, mode & ~ENABLE_ECHO_INPUT );
if(fputs(prompt, stdout) == EOF ||
fgets(buf, maxlen, stdin) == NULL) {
SetConsoleMode(handle,mode);
return -1;
} ....
Program 9: Side-effect of mode decides on echo output of fgets
In Program 9, the function t getpass first gets the current mode of the console by the
function GetConsoleMode; then it sets a new console mode by inverting the bit ENABLE ECHO INPUT
in the mode through the function SetConsoleMode which clearly disables the echo of input
read from standard input. The function GetConsoleMode is modelled by nondeterministic-
ally setting the mode to any integer value, the function SetConsoleMode sets a global mode
variable to its second argument. The function fgets, which reads a number of bytes from
stdin, is modelled to return its first argument buf completely if the mode is set to echo
the input and return a constant value otherwise.
With this setup CBMC proves through our driver that starting from any initial mode,
the program will always end up with log2(| ≃P |) = 0, i.e. that there is no leakage. We can
also successfully check that if the line which disables the echo is removed then the policy is
violated.
IMSPD. The function checked in this test is login plaintext in imsp/login unix.c
as shown in Program 10.
The program first tries to receive the stored password context of a user using the function
getpwnam. If successful, it will compare the stored with the entered password using strcmp.
If this fails it will set the string reply to “wrong password”. If authentication is successful
it returns 0.
Clearly, this function has three distinguishable observations: (1) it returns 1 (2) it returns
1 and sets *reply (3) it returns 0. We modelled the three parameters to the function as low
user input and the stored password as confidential variable. With this setup, we are able
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int login_plaintext(char *user, char* pass, char** reply) {
...
struct passwd* pwd = getpwnam(user);
if (!pwd) return 1;
if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, crypt(pass, pwd->pw_passwd)) != 0) {
*reply = "wrong password";
return 1;
}
return 0;
Program 10: Login function of IMSPD.
to verify that this program conforms to a policy which only leaks 3 observations, within 9
seconds.
6. Related Work
There have been several attempts in recent years to build a quantitative analysis of
leakage, starting with the static analysis in [4].
The most relevant works for this paper are [1] by M. Backes, B. Ko¨pf and A. Rybalchenko
and [8] by J. Heusser and P. Malacaria where verification techniques are used to compute
leakage of programs. Those works are both inspired by the important previous theoretical
work on self composition by G. Barthe, P. D’Argenio, and T. Rezk [2] and T. Terauchi and
A. Aiken [18]. However as already noted, those approaches attempts primarily to answer
questions about how much a program leak and seem unable to scale to real code in terms
of line of code, state space and language constructs. In particular, they have not, as far as
we are aware, been used to analyse independently existing vulnerabilities in independently
existing programs.
On the theoretical side, the complexity of QIF analysis has recently been thoroughly
investigated by H. Yasuoka and T. Terauchi [19] who, amongst other aspects, explored the
relation to verification and k-safety properties.
Approaches that do scale to large programs are by S. McCamant, M. D. Ernst [14] and
J. Newsome, S. McCamant, D. Song [15]. They released an impressive tool, FlowCheck,
which is able to analyse very large programs. There are however significant differences
between the approaches in that FlowCheck is a security testing tool based on the Valgrind
dynamic instrumentation framework whereas our approach is based on verification and
static analysis techniques. Thus, our work comes with stronger theoretical guarantees (for
example verification of the official patches) and does not require to “run” the code.
D. Kroening’s CBMC [5] has been used for many practical applications. A good overview
over the applied fields can be found under the following link [6].
7. Conclusion
In this paper we combined state of the art model checking with theoretical work on
Quantitative Information Flow, to provide a powerful tool for the analysis of leakage of
information. We demonstrated not only that CVE reported vulnerabilities such as for the
Linux kernel can be analysed with a level of scalability and precision able to find real
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security vulnerabilities, but that it is also possible to prove whether the official patches fix
the problem. We argued that leaks are not synonymous of a security breach and hence
a quantitative framework is better equipped than a qualitative one to determine when an
information leak represents a security threat.
We see this work as a significant step in the application of academic research on inform-
ation flow analysis to real-world problems in systems software.
References
[1] Michael Backes and Boris Ko¨pf and Andrey Rybalchenko: Automatic Discovery and Quantification of
Information Leaks. Proc. 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P ’09)
[2] Barthe, Gilles and D’Argenio, Pedro R. and Rezk, Tamara: Secure Information Flow by Self-
Composition. CSFW ’04: Proceedings of the 17th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations.
[3] David Clark, Sebastian Hunt, Pasquale Malacaria: A static analysis for quantifying information flow
in a simple imperative language. Journal of Computer Security, Volume 15, Number 3 / 2007.
[4] David Clark, Sebastian Hunt, and Pasquale Malacaria: Quantitative information flow, relations and
polymorphic types. Journal of Logic and Computation, Special Issue on Lambda-calculus, type theory
and natural language, 18(2):181-199, 2005.
[5] Clarke, Edmund, and Kroening, Daniel, and Lerda, Flavio: A Tool for Checking ANSI-C Programs.
Tools and Algorithms for the Construction and Analysis of Systems (TACAS 2004). Springer, 168–176,
Volume 2988
[6] http://www.cprover.org/cbmc/applications.shtml – Checked 17 June 2010.
[7] Joseph A. Goguen, Jos Meseguer: Security Policies and Security Models. IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy 1982: 11-20
[8] Jonathan Heusser and Pasquale Malacaria: Applied Quantitative Information Flow and Statistical
Databases. Formal Aspects in Security and Trust 2009: 96-110
[9] Boris Ko¨pf and Andrey Rybalchenko: Approximation and randomization for quantitative information-
flow analysis. In Proceedings CST 2010
[10] Landauer, J., and Redmond, T.: A Lattice of Information. In Proc. of the IEEE Computer Security
Foundations Workshop. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1993.
[11] Pasquale Malacaria: Assessing security threats of looping constructs. Proc. ACM Symposium on
Principles of Programming Language, 2007.
[12] Pasquale Malacaria, Han Chen: Lagrange multipliers and maximum information leakage in different
observational models. PLAS 2008: 135-146
[13] Pasquale Malacaria and Jonathan Heusser: Information Theory and Security: Quantitative Informa-
tion Flow. In Formal Methods for Quantitative Aspects of Programming Languages, LNCS, Springer
Verlag, 2010
[14] Stephen McCamant, Michael D. Ernst: Quantitative information flow as network flow capacity. PLDI
2008: 193-205 MIT Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Ph.D., Cambridge,
MA, 2008.
[15] James Newsome, Stephen McCamant, Dawn Song: Measuring channel capacity to distinguish undue
influence. PLAS 2009: 73-85
[16] Benjamin Schwarz, Hao Chen, David Wagner, Jeremy Lin, Wei Tu, Geoff Morrison, Jacob West:
Model Checking An Entire Linux Distribution for Security Violations. ACSAC 2005: 13-22
[17] Pasareanu, Corina S. and Dwyer, Matthew B. and Huth, Michael: Assume-Guarantee Model Checking
of Software: A Comparative Case Study. Proceedings of the 5th and 6th International SPINWorkshops
on Theoretical and Practical Aspects of SPIN Model Checking,1999
[18] T. Terauchi and A. Aiken. Secure information flow as a safety problem: In SAS, volume 3672 of LNCS,
pages 352–367, 2005.
[19] Hirotoshi Yasuoka and Tachio Terauchi Quantitative information flow - verification hardness and
possibilities. In Proceedings CSF 2010.
